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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The educational process at a college or university, where stu-
dents often experience new-found freedom, includes adherence to 
academic and behavioral standards.1  The institution may impose 
sanctions on students for breaching these standards.2  Prior to impos-
ing a sanction, however, an institution must provide the student with 
a sufficient level of process or risk judicial invalidation of the sanc-
tion.3 
Courts distinguish the process due a student attending a state in-
stitution from the process due a student attending a private institu-
  
*  Paul Smith is a patent associate in the Intellectual Property Group at Downs 
Rachlin Martin PLLC (DRM), practicing in the firm’s Burlington, Vermont office.  
DRM is the exclusive member firm for Vermont of Lex Mundi, the world’s lead-
ing association of independent law firms. 
The author wishes to thank Alice Briggs for her writing advice, Robert Donin, 
Dartmouth College General Counsel for many thoughtful and productive discus-
sions, and the attorneys and staff of the Dartmouth College Office of General 
Counsel for an enriching time together.   
 1. See Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
 2. See, e.g., Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that schools may impose disciplinary rules on stu-
dents as a condition of attendance); see Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 979. 
 3. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579. 
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tion.4  Related to this distinction is the judicial claim that courts 
grant discretion to a private institution’s judgment regarding discip-
line for academic, as opposed to behavioral, matters.5  However, as 
actually applied, the difference between the process due students at 
state institutions and those at private institutions is questionable.6  
Furthermore, the actual discretion afforded to private institutions for 
their academic-violation processes is similarly questionable.7   
This article will analyze five issues related to the distinction be-
tween state and private institution disciplinary proceedings.  First, 
this article will analyze the process due a sanctioned student at a pri-
vate institution.  Second, it will compare the process due a sanc-
tioned student at a private institution with the process due a student 
at a state institution and assert that the practical differences are 
small.  Third, it will analyze the judicial claim that more discretion is 
afforded private institutions in academic disciplinary matters and 
assert that this discretion is applied inconsistently between courts.  
Fourth, this article will present the judicial doctrines regarding re-
view of a private institution’s behavioral disciplinary proceedings.  
Finally, this article will provide recommendations to private institu-
tions regarding disciplinary policy creation and implementation. 
II. PRIVATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION DISCIPLINARY LEGAL 
REQUIREMENTS  
A private institution’s relationship with its students is primarily 
contractual.8  In return for tuition and fees paid by students, the insti-
tution provides students with classes and instruction, usually culmi-
nating in a degree.9  The relationship is not purely contractual, 
though, because it has elements of a voluntary association.10  As part 
  
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 578–79 (citing Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 
158–59 (5th Cir. 1961)). 
 6. See infra Part III. 
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579.  
 9. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1982). 
 10. Id. 
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of this voluntary association, the students must conduct themselves 
according to published standards as a condition of graduation.11  For 
example, graduation is conditioned on adherence to academic and 
behavioral standards established by the institution and typically pub-
lished in a student handbook.12  Similarly, because the relationship is 
primarily contractual, the contract must be followed by the private 
institution during disciplinary proceedings.13  
In addition to these contractual obligations, a private institution’s 
disciplinary proceedings must also be fundamentally fair.14  Funda-
mental fairness resembles the due process required to impose sanc-
tions on students at state institutions.15  These judicial requirements 
have been imposed for policy reasons: Courts recognize that higher 
education is no longer a luxury but, rather, an important requirement 
of modern society.16 
A.  The Disciplinary Process at a Private Institution Must Be Fun-
damentally Fair 
Courts require fundamentally fair disciplinary procedures at pri-
vate institutions.17  Several factors determine the fundamental fair-
ness of the process.18  These factors include: (1) whether the institu-
tion’s regulations are reasonable; (2) whether the institution’s regula-
tions are known or should be known by the student; (3) whether the 
proceedings are before the appropriate people empowered to act; (4) 
whether the hearing panel determines cases based on substantial evi-
  
 11. Id. 
 12. See id. 
 13. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 579. 
 14. 2 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
§ 9.4.4 (4th ed. 2006). 
 15. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 580 (stating that recent courts have required private 
educational institution’s disciplinary procedures to be consistent with “basic no-
tions of due process and fundamental fairness”). 
 16. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 17. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 580. 
 18. Id. at 580–81 (quoting Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 625 
(10th Cir. 1975)). 
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dence;19 and (5) whether the student has been notified of the 
charges.20 
For example, by applying these factors, the court deciding 
Boehm v. University of Pennsylvania School of Veterinary Medicine 
found a private institution’s disciplinary process to be fundamentally 
fair.21  Specifically, the disciplinary process was found fundamental-
ly fair because the students were notified of the evidence and 
charges against them, they were present at the disciplinary hearing, 
and they were assisted in their defense by a faculty advisor.22  Final-
ly, the hearing was before an established disciplinary board that, as a 
result of the hearing, made specific findings of fact, thereby meeting 
the substantial evidence requirement.23  Therefore, as illustrated in 
Boehm, a disciplinary process is fundamentally fair if each of the 
above factors is satisfied. 
While not analyzed in Boehm, fundamental fairness also requires 
that a student be notified of all charges with sufficient particularity 
to prepare a defense.24  For example, in Fellheimer v. Middlebury 
College, an accused student was notified of a rape charge but not of 
a “disrespect of persons” charge.25  Because the accused student was 
not notified of this second charge, he was unable to prepare an ade-
quate defense.26  Even though the court did not analyze the other 
fundamental fairness factors, the court ruled the process unfair be-
cause of this lack of notice.27   
Therefore, based on these cases, an institution’s disciplinary 
process is fundamentally fair when it contains the previously dis-
cussed factors.28  However, fundamental fairness is not the only 
measurement used by courts to evaluate an institution’s disciplinary 
  
 19. Id.   
 20. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 245 (D. Vt. 1994). 
 21. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 582–83. 
 24. Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 246. 
 25. Id. at 245. 
 26. Id. at 246. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See supra text accompanying notes 20–21.   
File: Smith - Vol.  9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on:  5/30/2011 11:59:00 PM Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:00:00 AM 
448    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3 
procedures.29  Because the relationship between a student and a pri-
vate institution is primarily contractual,30 a court will also examine 
whether the institution adhered to the contract as evidenced by its 
published disciplinary procedures.31  
B.  A Private Institution Must Follow Its Published Disciplinary 
Procedures 
A private institution must follow its own published disciplinary 
procedures because these published procedures embody the terms of 
the contract with the student.32  These procedures are bargained for 
when the student decides to attend a particular institution33 and are 
evidenced by the student handbook and other institutional publica-
tions and practices.34  Distribution of the handbook constitutes con-
structive notice of these established disciplinary procedures.35  For 
example, in Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca College, the plaintiff-student was 
held to be constructively notified of the disciplinary procedures 
when he received the college code of conduct during registration.36  
Therefore, in addition to fundamental fairness, a second judicial re-
quirement placed on private educational institutions is that the insti-
tution adheres to its published policies, thereby providing actual or 
constructive notice to the students.37  However, as important as this 
requirement is, the institution can deviate from the published proce-
dures under some circumstances. 
  
 29. Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1990). 
 30. Id. at 579. 
 31. Id. at 580. 
 32. Id. at 579. 
 33. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 243 (D. Vt. 1994) 
(“[A] College is nonetheless contractually bound to provide students with the pro-
cedural safeguards that it has promised.”).  
 34. See id. at 242. 
 35. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 245. 
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1. Private Institutions, Disciplinary Process Deviations, and 
Fundamental Fairness 
While an institution must generally adhere to its published dis-
ciplinary procedures, the institution may deviate from the procedures 
as long as the overall process remains fundamentally fair.38  For ex-
ample, even though the established disciplinary process does not 
expressly provide for it, an imposed sanction may be overruled by a 
senior administration official as long as the overall process remains 
fundamentally fair.39  An institution’s ability to deviate from the 
process may be legally strengthened by reserving the right to deviate 
from the process in the publications establishing the institution-
student contract. 
a. Senior Administrators, Deviations from the Process, and 
Maintaining Fundamental Fairness  
A disciplinary process remains fundamentally fair even when a 
senior administration official increases a sanction beyond that im-
posed by a disciplinary hearing, even when the official does not have 
express contractual authority to do so.40  For example, in Boehm, two 
veterinary students were accused of cheating, tried by a disciplinary 
panel, and sanctioned by the panel with academic probation.41  How-
ever, the Dean of the Veterinary School modified the sanction by 
imposing, inter alia, a one-year suspension.42  The students sued on 
the theory that the Dean breached the contract by imposing a more 
severe sanction than that imposed by the disciplinary panel.43  The 
court rejected the students’ argument, implying that even if the Dean 
had deviated from the established disciplinary process, the process 
remained fundamentally fair, and that a court would not substitute its 
  
 38. Id. at 244. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 577 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that the Dean acted properly by increasing the sanction 
imposed on the students). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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judgment in place of the Dean’s.44  Furthermore, because the sanc-
tion imposed by the disciplinary committee was merely a recom-
mendation, and not binding, the Dean did not breach the contract.45  
Therefore, while an institution should abide by its contractually bar-
gained-for disciplinary process, it can deviate from the process as 
long as the modified process remains fundamentally fair.46 
b. Fundamental Fairness and Notice of the Charges 
Failure to notify a student of a disciplinary charge is not a fun-
damentally fair process deviation because it deprives the student of 
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.47  For example, in 
Fellheimer, a student accused of rape sued to enjoin his suspension 
because of, inter alia, a breach of contract.48  This claim was based 
on the fact that the college did not notify the student of one of the 
charges brought against him in the disciplinary proceeding.49  The 
court found that deviating from the process by omitting notice of a 
serious charge, thereby depriving the student of an opportunity to 
prepare an adequate defense, was not fundamentally fair.50  There-
fore, omitting notice of a charge from the disciplinary process is not 
a permitted process deviation.  
2. The  Contractual  Right  to  Deviate  from  the  Published 
Procedures 
An institution’s power to deviate from the disciplinary process is 
strengthened when the school reserves the right to deviate from the 
process in the student handbook or another publication.51  For exam-
ple, as discussed previously, the student in Fellheimer brought a 
  
 44. Id. at 582. 
 45. Id. at 585. 
 46. See Boehm, 573 A.2d at 577. 
 47. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 246–47 (D. Vt. 1994). 
 48. Id. at 242. 
 49. Id. at 246. 
 50. Id. at 244, 246–47 (“The College has agreed to provide students with pro-
ceedings that conform to a standard of ‘fundamental fairness . . . .’”). 
 51. Id. at 244.  
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breach of contract claim against the college.52  This claim was based 
on the college’s failure to provide “procedural protections equivalent 
to those required under Federal and State constitutions.”53  While 
ultimately ruling for the student on the grounds discussed previous-
ly, the court dismissed the breach of contract claim for two rea-
sons.54  First, the published conduct code expressly disclaimed insti-
tutional procedural protections coextensive with constitutional pro-
tections.55  Second, the published conduct code reserved the right for 
the college to modify the disciplinary procedures from those pub-
lished as long as the proceedings remained fundamentally fair.56  
The court acknowledged that this second provision was sufficient to 
protect the college from claims for breach of contract.57  
Therefore, a private institution’s disciplinary process must meet 
two judicially imposed requirements for a sanction to withstand 
judicial review.58  First, the disciplinary procedures must be funda-
mentally fair, and, second, they must be consistent with the pub-
lished procedures that establish the contract between the institution 
and the student.59  This second requirement is less rigid than the first 
because senior administration officials can deviate from the process 
as long as the deviation preserves fundamental fairness.60   
Courts routinely distinguish these two requirements from consti-
tutional due process granted to students at state educational institu-
tions.61  However, in spite of these routine judicial distinctions, there 
  
 52. Id. at 242. 
 53. Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 243. 
 54. Id. at 243–44.  
 55. Id. at 243. 
 56. Id. at 244.  The handbook stated: “The following procedures are designed to 
promote fairness, and will be adhered to as faithfully as possible.  If exceptional 
circumstances dictate variation from these procedures, the variation will not inva-
lidate a decision unless it prevented a fair hearing or abrogated the rights of a stu-
dent.”  Id. 
 57. See id. (stating that the “provision negates any argument that the College has 
contractually guaranteed that the specific procedures it has outlined will always be 
scrupulously adhered to”).   
 58. See supra Part II.A–B. 
 59. See supra Part II.A–B.  
 60. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 61. See, e.g., Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 977 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1975). 
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is little practical difference between the process required at a private 
educational institution and the process required at a state educational 
institution. 
III. PRIVATE INSTITUTION FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS REQUIREMENT 
COMPARED TO PUBLIC INSTITUTION CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS 
REQUIREMENT  
Because only public institutions must provide students with con-
stitutional due process, courts routinely emphasize that a student at a 
private institution subjected to a disciplinary proceeding is not en-
titled to constitutional due process.62  Rather, the private institution’s 
student is entitled to a fundamentally fair proceeding.63  While courts 
consistently reject the attempts of students at private institutions to 
claim due process rights, constitutional due process for state educa-
tional institution discipline is very similar to fundamental fairness 
for private institution discipline.64 
A.  Constitutional Due Process at a State Educational Institution 
Requires Notice of the Charges and an Opportunity to Be Heard 
As established in the foundational case of Goss v. Lopez,65 state 
educational institutions must provide students with constitutional 
due process before imposing a sanction.66  Due process for a discip-
linary charge at a state institution requires notice to the student of the 
charges against him and an opportunity to be heard.67  For example, 
in Goss, a number of students were suspended from a state educa-
tional institution without a hearing, without an opportunity to present 
  
 62. Id. 
 63. Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing discipline imposed by state institutions compared to 
private institutions). 
 64. See, e.g., Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238 (D. Vt. 1994); 
Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 973; Boehm, 573 A.2d at 575. 
 65. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
 66. Id. at 573–74.  
 67. Id. at 581.  Even less due process is required for failing to meet academic 
standards; in these cases, no hearing is required to satisfy due process.  Bd. of 
Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 87–88 (1978). 
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their version of the facts, and, in some cases, without notice.68  Be-
cause the suspensions were imposed by Ohio state schools, and be-
cause the suspended students possessed a property interest in their 
educations,69 the Supreme Court found that constitutional due 
process applied.70  The Court also found that the process due re-
quired notice and an opportunity to be heard.71  Therefore, Goss re-
solves the question of the process due a student before a state institu-
tion may impose a sanction.72 
B.  The  Similarity  Between  Constitutional  Due  Process  and  
Fundamental Fairness 
Even though courts regularly state that fundamental fairness does 
not require disciplinary procedures to be consistent with constitu-
tionally required due process,73 these two doctrines lack significant 
practical distinctions when they are applied.74  For example, funda-
mental fairness is analyzed using the factors discussed previously: 
notice of the charge and evidence asserted against the student, pres-
ence of the student at the disciplinary hearing, assistance with prepa-
ration of the defense, and a hearing before an established discipli-
nary board.75  These factors are similar to the constitutional due 
process requirements established by the Court in Goss.76  These due 
process requirements are notice of the charges, evidence against the 
student, and opportunity for the student to be heard.77  The only 
  
 68. Goss, 419 U.S. at 570–71. 
 69. Id. at 574. 
 70. Id. at 576. 
 71. Id. at 579. 
 72. Id. at 581. 
 73. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1982) (citing State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (N.J. 1980)); see 
Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990) (distinguishing standards for imposing discipline in state institutions from 
private institutions). 
 74. Compare Goss, 419 U.S. at 572, 574, 579, with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 581–82 
(both stating that notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a non-arbitrary decision 
are sufficient to meet their respective standards). 
 75. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582. 
 76. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 572, 579. 
 77. Id. 
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possible substantive difference between fundamental fairness and 
constitutional due process is that Goss does not require that a student 
be assisted with his defense, as fundamental fairness may.78  Because 
this difference is only a single factor within the fundamental fairness 
analysis and the remaining elements, including notice of charges and 
an opportunity to be heard, are the same between the two doctrines, 
they are more similar than courts acknowledge.79 
An example of private institution fundamental fairness being 
practically equivalent to public institution constitutional due process 
can be seen in Kwiatkowski.  In Kwiatkowski, a student was accused 
of throwing his mattress out of a tenth-story dormitory window.80  
After being sanctioned by a disciplinary panel, the student sued to 
enjoin his suspension on the theory that he was denied constitutional 
due process.81  The court rejected the student’s claim because the 
private institution followed its published disciplinary process and the 
disciplinary process was fundamentally fair.82  However, even 
though the court rejected the student’s due process argument, the 
student received protections practically equivalent to those required 
by due process.83  For example, as part of fundamental fairness, the 
student was notified of the charges against him and had an opportu-
nity to be heard by a disciplinary panel.84  These two elements of 
  
 78. Compare id. at 583 (stating that assistance of counsel is not required at the 
hearing), with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582 (stating that assistance of counsel at the 
hearing is a factor contributing to fundamental fairness). 
 79. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 273 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1982) (citing State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 619 (N.J. 1980)); see 
Boehm, 573 A.2d 575, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing standards for 
imposing discipline in state institutions from private institutions). 
 80. Kwiatkowski v. Ithaca Coll., 368 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 81. Id. at 977.  In this case, the court rejected the student’s attempt to claim con-
stitutional due process of a criminal defendant, including the right to remain silent, 
assistance of counsel, and the right to confront witnesses.  Id. at 978.  These rights 
far exceed constitutional due process requirements in educational matters.  Goss, 
419 U.S. at 572. 
 82. See Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 977 (citing the requirement for a funda-
mentally fair process and ruling for the defendant college). 
 83. Id. at 976. 
 84. Id. 
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fundamental fairness are practically equivalent to elements of consti-
tutional due process for state educational institutions.85 
As discussed, courts claim a distinction between the process due 
students at state educational institutions versus private educational 
institutions.  However, this distinction is often made in response to a 
student attempting to claim the process due a criminal defendant.86  
This is exemplified in Kwiatkowski, in which the student attempted 
to claim all aspects of criminal due process.87  Also, the actual dif-
ferences between educational due process requirements and private 
institution fundamental fairness, as they are applied, are debatable. 
Similar to this previously discussed distinction without a differ-
ence, courts often claim to give private educational institutions addi-
tional deference when reviewing academic, as opposed to behavior-
al, disciplinary cases.88  Similar to the previous discussion, this judi-
cially claimed distinction is often also illusory.  
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION FOR PRIVATE 
INSTITUTIONS 
Courts regularly assert a distinction between the judicial review 
of academic disciplinary proceedings and behavioral disciplinary 
proceedings conducted by private educational institutions.89  Specifi-
cally, courts claim to grant discretion to private institutions regarding 
their review of academic disciplinary proceedings, which they do not 
grant when reviewing behavioral disciplinary proceedings.90  Even 
  
 85. Goss, 419 U.S. at 572. 
 86. See Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 978 (claiming due process violations for 
lack of assistance of counsel, “inability to remain silent,” and lack of ability to 
confront witnesses).  None of these rights comprise due process in state education-
al institution cases but are included in criminal due process.  Goss, 419 U.S. at 
572. 
 87. Kwiatkowski, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 978. 
88.  See Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 274 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1982). 
 89. See, e.g., KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 14, § 9.4.4 (stating this proposition and 
citing cases to support it).   
 90. See, e.g., Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 274–75 (stating the distinction between 
academic and behavioral disciplinary proceedings). 
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though the accuracy of this claim is dubious, there are two reasons 
cited for it.91  
The first reason is the claim that private educational institutions 
occupy a special place in both academia and society that courts are 
reluctant to disturb.92  Specifically, private educational institutions 
are “unique in their insulation from state taxation controls and their 
self government,” and have intellectual freedom unfettered by state 
interference.93  The second reason is that academic disciplinary pro-
ceedings involve facts that, for proper judgment, are more likely to 
require specialized knowledge particular to an educational institution 
setting.94  Less discretion is afforded to behavioral disciplinary pro-
ceedings because a behavioral proceeding’s facts are more familiar 
to the judiciary and do not require any specialized knowledge.95  
Therefore, courts justify granting more discretion for judicial review 
of academic sanctions than for behavioral sanctions.96  Courts are, 
however, inconsistent in their actual application of this claimed dis-
cretion.97 
A.  The Variation Between Courts in the Degree of Discretion 
Granted   
Different courts grant private institutions varying degrees of dis-
cretion when reviewing academic discipline cases (e.g., cheating, 
plagiarism) compared to behavioral discipline cases (e.g., battery, 
unlawful alcohol use, sexual assault).98  This variation can be ana-
  
 91. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 582 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990). 
 92. Id. (citing Schulman v. Franklin & Marshall Coll., 538 A.2d 49, 52 (Pa. Su-
per. Ct. 1988)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See, e.g., Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 275 (explaining that academic sanctions 
are beyond the expertise of a court (citing Bd. of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horo-
witz, 435 U.S. 78, 88–89 (1978))). 
 95. Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980). 
 96. See id.; Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 274.  
 97. See infra Part IV.A.1–4.  Compare, e.g., Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977), with Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582 (illustrating the 
differing levels of discretion afforded private institutions for academic disciplinary 
proceedings). 
 98. See infra Parts IV.A.1–4. 
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lyzed by grouping cases into four classes of the judicial discretion 
actually granted.  An institution receives the most discretion when a 
court refuses to analyze the case beyond an initial determination that 
the matter involves only academic discipline.99  The institution rece-
ives less discretion when a court conducts an analysis of the institu-
tion’s adherence to its contract with the student and the fundamental 
fairness of the process.100  Even less discretion is afforded to the in-
stitution when a court conducts a thorough factual analysis of all 
aspects of the case.101  This thorough analysis allows the court to 
review the institution’s handling of its disciplinary proceeding, the-
reby denying the institution the discretion purportedly granted.102  
Finally, a court affords the least discretion when it conducts a de 
novo review of the factual record and declines to grant any discre-
tion.103 
1. The Greatest Amount of Discretion Is Granted When a Court 
Declines to Review Any Aspect of the Academic Disciplinary 
Proceeding 
A court grants a private institution the most discretion for aca-
demic disciplinary proceedings when the court declines to review 
any aspect of the case beyond determining that the proceeding is 
genuinely an academic matter and not a behavioral one.104  Academ-
ic matters are those requiring the specialized knowledge of an educa-
tor to judge appropriately, like plagiarism, while behavioral matters 
do not require specialized knowledge because they involve facts 
courts regularly deal with, like sexual assault.105  By declining to 
review a case beyond this threshold, the court grants the institution 
the most discretion possible because it permits the institution to ad-
minister the academic disciplinary proceeding in any way the institu-
  
 99. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
100. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
101. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
102. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
103. See infra Part IV.A.4. 
104. See Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
105.  See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980). 
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tion sees fit.106  Additional judicial analysis only reduces the amount 
of discretion available to the institution. 
For example, the court in Jansen v. Emory University declined to 
analyze the case after determining that the issue was genuinely aca-
demic.107  Specifically, the appellate court held that neither it nor the 
trial court had the legal authority to interfere with the academic dis-
ciplinary proceedings at a private institution.108  The court reasoned 
that it would not interfere because of the strong policy reasons sup-
porting the self-governance of medical (and dental) schools, includ-
ing the freedom to determine appropriate academic standards.109  
In Jansen, the student enrolled in a dentistry program.110  Over 
the course of the student’s education, he consistently violated aca-
demic standards: He was among the worst academic performers in 
his class, he cheated on an assignment, he improperly assigned his 
assignment to a hygienist, he worked on a class project outside of 
class, and he injured a patient.111  Finally, over sixty-six percent of 
the faculty voted to expel the student.112  The student sued the insti-
tution for breach of contract, claiming that the student handbook 
guaranteed an accused student constitutional due process.113  The 
court rejected this claim, even though the handbook stated that stu-
dents would receive “due process,” and held that the student’s at-
  
106. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp at 1063. 
107. See id.  
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1061. 
111. Id. 
112. Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1061. 
113. Id. at 1062.  The handbook stated: “Attendance at Emory is a privilege and 
not a right; however, no student will be dismissed without due process.”  Id.  The 
court responded:  
Over these bare bones the plaintiff attempts to drape the entire panop-
ly of due process rights developed by the Supreme Court in cases such 
as Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 
2d 548 (1971), and Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S. Ct. 729, 42 L. 
Ed. 2d 725 (1975).  Based on the assumption that the Emory contract 
meant to define ‘due process’ in such a manner, the plaintiff argues 
that the process he received was deficient and thus constituted a 
breach.  The underlying assumption is extravagant. 
Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1062. 
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tempt to invoke constitutional due process as defined by Goss while 
attending a private institution was “extravagant.”114   
The Jansen court granted this private institution the most discre-
tion possible because it refused to second-guess the decision of the 
faculty regarding its academic disciplinary action.115  The court 
merely determined that the institutional proceeding was academic.116  
Beyond this threshold determination, the court declined to consider 
any factual disputes alleged by the student because the student con-
duct at issue was academic, not behavioral.117  In fact, the court 
made only a perfunctory examination of the student’s claim that the 
institution had acted arbitrarily and capriciously.118  Therefore, be-
cause the Jansen court relied almost exclusively on academic discip-
linary discretion in its decision by refusing to review other facts, it 
afforded the private institution the greatest amount of discretion 
possible.  
2. Less Discretion Is Granted When a Court Analyzes Funda-
mental Fairness and Contract Compliance 
A court grants less discretion when it performs a factual analysis 
regarding the fundamental fairness of the institution’s procedures 
and its adherence to the contract with students.  This factual analysis 
erodes the doctrine of discretion by providing an opportunity for a 
court to interfere with a private institution’s academic disciplinary 
process.  For example, the discretion granted in the academic discip-
linary case of Boehm was not as broad as the discretion granted in 
Jansen because the Boehm court factually analyzed whether the in-
stitution adhered to its contract and whether the process was funda-
mentally fair.119  Ultimately, because the appellate court ruled for the 
  
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 1063. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1063.  The court quoted another case stating: “The federal judiciary 
should not adjudicate the soundness of a professor’s grading system, nor make a 
factual determination of the fairness of the individual grades.”  Id. (quoting Keys 
v. Sawyer, 353 F. Supp. 936, 940 (S.D. Tex. 1973)). 
118. Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1063. 
119. See id.; Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 582 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). 
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institution and chided the lower court for interfering with the aca-
demic disciplinary process of a private institution, the appellate court 
granted greater discretion to the institution than the lower court.120   
In Boehm, two students were accused of cheating, tried accord-
ing to the published disciplinary procedures, found guilty, and sanc-
tioned with, inter alia, one-year suspensions.121  The students sued to 
enjoin the sanctions, asserting that the school deviated from its pub-
lished disciplinary process and that the process lacked fundamental 
fairness.122  The trial court granted a preliminary injunction, and the 
institution appealed.123  The appellate court then granted the institu-
tion discretion by overturning the trial court’s preliminary injunc-
tion.124   
As in Jansen, the appellate court, acknowledging academic dis-
ciplinary discretion, determined that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by granting the preliminary injunction.125  However, un-
like Jansen, the Boehm court reduced the discretion granted by en-
gaging in a factual analysis of the case.126  Before reaching its deci-
sion, the Boehm court thoroughly analyzed the facts relating to the 
academic disciplinary process for adherence to published procedures 
and for fundamental fairness.127  This is in contrast to Jansen, where 
the court declined to factually review the case because the doctrine 
granting discretion to private institutions for academic disciplinary 
matters prevented judicial interference.128  This distinction between 
Jansen and Boehm illustrates that, even where a court grants discre-
tion to a private institution, the degree of discretion granted can vary 
from court to court. 
  
120. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 586. 
121. Id. at 577. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 586. 
125. Jansen v. Emory Univ., 440 F. Supp. 1060, 1063 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Boehm, 
573 A.2d at 586. 
126. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 582–85.  
127. Id. 
128. See Jansen, 440 F. Supp. at 1063. 
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3.  Even Less Discretion Is Granted When a Court Conducts a 
Complete Factual Review of the Case   
Unlike the two previously discussed judicial approaches granting 
discretion to private institutions for academic disciplinary matters 
where a court declines, either in whole or in part, to review the case 
factually, even less discretion is granted when a court undertakes a 
thorough factual analysis of the matter.  In this role, the court does 
not afford discretion to the private institution because the court is 
acting as a “super-trier”129 of fact.130  The following case provides an 
example of this third approach to judicial review of academic discip-
linary cases.131 
In Napolitano v. Trustees of Princeton University, a Princeton 
student was accused of an academic offense (plagiarism), tried by 
the disciplinary committee, and sanctioned with a one-year delay in 
degree conferral.132  After a failed appeal to the university president, 
the institution denied the student an injunction staying her sanc-
tion.133  The student then sued under a breach of contract theory, 
alleging that the institution failed to adhere to its published discipli-
nary procedures.134  The appellate court upheld the trial court, rea-
soning that a court may not substitute its own judgment for that of a 
private institution in academic disciplinary matters.135  The appellate 
court reasoned that substitution was improper because the decision 
to impose a sanction for an academic violation is the province of the 
expert educator and not a court.136  However, the appellate court’s 
own conduct in this case was inconsistent with its hollow recitation 
  
129. Napolitano v. Trs. of Princeton Univ., 453 A.2d 263, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1982). 
130. Id. at 276.  The appellate court agreed that the trial court properly did not 
become a “super-trier,” but then stated: “Our independent examination of the 
record satisfies us that the [Committee on Discipline] properly concluded that the 
plaintiff had plagiarized,” thereby itself improperly assuming the role of a super-
trier and weakening the discretion afforded to the private institution.  Id. 
131. See id. at 275. 
132. Id. at 267–68. 
133. Id. at 268. 
134. Id. at 267. 
135. Napolitano, 453 A.2d at 275. 
136. Id. 
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of this principle: It stated that becoming a “super-trier” was inappro-
priate but then proceeded to examine the entire trial record.137   
While the Napolitano court discussed affording discretion to the 
institution, the court undermined this discretion by conducting an 
independent, de novo factual analysis of the trial record.138  By con-
ducting this factual analysis, the appellate court became a “super-
trier.”139  For example, in its lengthy opinion, the appellate court 
conducted its own examination of whether the student had actually 
plagiarized.140  Because the appellate court second-guessed both the 
institution and the trial court by conducting an independent factual 
review, the actual discretion afforded was negligible, regardless of 
the court’s genuflection toward the discretion doctrine.  
4.  No  Discretion Is Afforded  When  a  Court  Ignores  the  
Discretion Doctrine Entirely 
Completing the range of inconsistency in the judicial approaches 
to granting discretion, some courts fail to even acknowledge the role 
of discretion in academic disciplinary cases at all.141  In fact, by de-
ciding a case without acknowledging the role of discretion, courts 
weaken the discretion doctrine further by creating a precedent in 
which discretion is ignored. 
This least amount of discretion that can be granted to a private 
institution is evident in the case of Lyons v. Salve Regina College.142  
In Lyons, the appellate court contemplated construing the terms of 
the published disciplinary procedures against the institution.143  
While it did not actually construe the procedures against the institu-
  
137. See id. at 275–78. 
138. See id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. See, e.g., Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(stating that the language of the student handbook should be construed against the 
college as the author thereof). 
142. See generally id.  
143. Id. at 202.  The court stated, “[w]hile arguably the language should be con-
strued against the College as the author thereof, nevertheless . . . .”  Id. 
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tion, neither did the court refer to the discretion typically granted to 
private institutions.144  
In Lyons, a student failed a course required for a nursing de-
gree.145  Upon review of the student’s case by an academic review 
board, the board voted 2–1 to give the student an “Incomplete” in-
stead of an “F.”146  However, the Dean overruled the board’s majori-
ty and failed the student.147  As a result, the student was not awarded 
a nursing degree.148  The student sought to compel the school to 
change her grade from an “F” to an “Incomplete,” alleging that the 
Dean’s intervention constituted a breach of contract.149  The trial 
court ignored the discretion doctrine by substituting its own judg-
ment for that of the Dean and determined that the recommendation 
from the disciplinary panel was binding on the Dean.150  As a result, 
the student prevailed and the trial court awarded the student a grade 
of “Incomplete.”151  The appellate court reversed the trial court by 
finding that the term “recommendation,” as used in the disciplinary 
handbook, was not binding on the Dean.152   
While the student ultimately lost her case and failed the course, 
neither the trial court153 nor the appellate court afforded the private 
institution any discretion for this academic matter.154  For example, 
the trial court deviated from the common understanding of the word 
“recommendation” in order to overrule the Dean’s academic discip-
linary decision.155  Similarly, while it ultimately chose otherwise, the 
appellate court considered construing the contract language “against 
  
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 201. 
146. Id. at 201–02. 
147. Lyons, 565 F.2d at 202. 
148. Id. at 201. 
149. Id. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 203. 
153. Lyons, 565 F.2d at 201 (construing the term “recommendation” to mean an 
order binding the Dean to the disciplinary panel’s sanction). 
154. See id. at 202 (stating the court’s interest in construing the terms of the hand-
book against the institution). 
155. Id. 
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the College as the author thereof.”156  Therefore, based on the actual 
and contemplated intervention with the institution’s academic discip-
linary process, Lyons shows the extent to which a court may impro-
perly substitute its own judgment for that of a private educational 
institution. 
Another example of a court failing to grant discretion to a private 
educational institution is evident in Melvin v. Union College.157  In 
Melvin, a student was accused of “academic dishonesty,” tried by a 
disciplinary panel, given a failing grade, and suspended for a year.158  
The student sued for breach of contract and sought a preliminary 
injunction.159  While the trial court denied the preliminary injunc-
tion, the appellate court overruled the trial court and granted relief.160  
In its analysis, the appellate court referred only to the traditional 
test needed to grant an injunction and did not refer to the need to 
afford a private institution discretion in academic disciplinary mat-
ters.161  This holding is in contrast to Boehm, where the appellate 
court reversed the trial court’s preliminary injunction, citing the lack 
of authority to interfere with the academic disciplinary process of a 
private institution.162  As with Lyons, Melvin is also an example of a 
court’s failure to grant discretion to a private educational institution 
in an academic disciplinary matter. 
Comparing Lyons and Melvin to Boehm highlights the judicial 
inconsistency in affording discretion to private educational institu-
tions.  While all factually similar, the reasoning in Boehm differs 
from that in both Lyons and Melvin.  As in Boehm, the student in 
Lyons sued for breach of contract because the Dean imposed a more 
severe sanction than that recommended by a majority of the discipli-
nary panel.163  Unlike Lyons and Melvin, however, the Boehm court 
stated that the trial court had no authority to interfere with a private 
  
156. Id. 
157. 600 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 
158. Id. at 142. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. See id. 
162. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1990). 
163. Lyons v. Salve Regina Coll., 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1997); Boehm, 573 
A.2d at 577. 
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institution’s decision to impose a sanction for an academic discipli-
nary matter by granting a preliminary injunction.164  This difference 
highlights the inconsistency in the amount of discretion granted to 
private institutions in academic disciplinary matters. 
The scope of judicial discretion granted to a private institution 
during a court’s review of an academic disciplinary proceeding is 
broad.  While some courts decline to substitute their judgment for 
that of the institution, thereby granting the institution a broad range 
of discretion, other courts conduct an independent factual review of 
some, or all, of the facts in the case, thereby limiting the institution’s 
discretion.  Because of this court-to-court variation, private institu-
tions, when drafting academic misconduct policies, should not rely 
on the judicial doctrine granting discretion to private educational 
institutions when reviewing academic disciplinary matters.  Howev-
er, unlike the judicial review of academic disciplinary matters, courts 
are consistent in their approach to behavioral disciplinary matters.  
V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF BEHAVIORAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
As discussed previously, courts generally do not afford discre-
tion in behavioral disciplinary matters because these matters are 
within the experience of the courts.165  While academic matters may 
require the expertise of a professional educator to judge properly, 
courts routinely hear cases involving bad behavior and, therefore, are 
capable of judging them without deferring to an expert educator.166  
When reviewing a private institution disciplinary proceeding for a 
behavioral charge, courts apply the two previously discussed proce-
dural requirements: fundamental fairness and the institution’s adhe-
rence to its contract with the student.167   
An example of a behavioral disciplinary case where the court 
strictly applied these two judicial requirements is Kwiatkowski.168  In 
that case, the student was charged with behavioral misconduct for 
  
164. Boehm, 573 A.2d at 578. 
165. See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304 (N.Y. 1980). 
166. See id. 
167.  See supra Part II. 
168. 368 N.Y.S.2d 973 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). 
File: Smith - Vol.  9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on:  5/30/2011 11:59:00 PM Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:00:00 AM 
466    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3 
pushing a mattress through a tenth-story dormitory window.169  
Upon suspension by a college disciplinary committee, the student 
sued for breach of contract, alleging that the college’s process was 
arbitrary and unfair.170  
The court ruled that the college’s process was fair and consistent 
with the contract, even though the process provided was not co-
extensive with constitutional due process.171  The court made no ref-
erence to the discretion afforded private institutions or to a different 
standard of review from academic disciplinary cases.172  Rather, the 
court limited its analysis to the process provided to the student using 
the judicially required elements: fundamental fairness and adherence 
to the institution’s contract with students.173  Because this was a be-
havioral disciplinary case, no discretion was granted.174 
Similarly, in Schaer v. Brandeis University,175 the court properly 
reviewed the case only based on whether the college met the two 
judicial requirements of fundamental fairness and adherence to the 
contract with students.176  In that behavioral disciplinary case, a stu-
dent was accused of rape, tried by a college disciplinary panel, and 
suspended for four months.177  The student sued to enjoin his sanc-
tion on the theory that the institution breached its contract by con-
ducting a process inconsistent with established disciplinary proce-
dures.178  Because the court determined that the college adhered to 
its published procedures, the student’s claim for breach of contract 
failed.179  The court expanded its analysis beyond the complaint and 
proceeded to examine the disciplinary process for fundamental fair-
ness.180  While the institution prevailed, the court made no mention 
of discretion.  In addition, as with nearly all other disciplinary cases, 
  
169. Id. at 976. 
170. Id. at 976–77. 
171. Id. at 979. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 977. 
174.  See Tedeschi v. Wagner Coll., 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1306 (N.Y. 1980). 
175. 735 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 2000). 
176. Id. at 378, 380. 
177. Id. at 376. 
178. Id. at 376–77.  
179. Id. at 378–80. 
180. Id. at 380. 
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the court expanded its analysis to include both elements of the two-
part judicial test, even though the student-plaintiff sued only on a 
contract theory.181 
Because no discretion is afforded a private institution for beha-
vioral disciplinary matters, institutions must be particularly careful 
to administer a process that meets the two-part judicial test.  Unlike 
Kwiatkowski and Schaer, in Fellheimer, the sanction imposed on the 
student was enjoined because the process lacked fundamental fair-
ness.182  The alleged breach was the failure to notify the student of 
one charge against him, thereby depriving him of a fundamentally 
fair process.183  The court ruled that the institution had breached its 
contract with the student because failure to notify the accused of a 
charge lacked fundamental fairness.184  Therefore, institutions must 
abide by the two judicial requirements in behavioral disciplinary 
matters because no discretion is afforded to the institution in these 
cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The process due a student at a private educational institution has 
two judicial requirements.  The first requirement is that the institu-
tion’s process be fundamentally fair.  The second requirement is that 
the institution meets its contractual obligations to its students.   
While courts routinely recite these requirements as the law go-
verning the disciplinary process at a private educational institution, 
courts also allege to grant private institutions discretion when re-
viewing academic disciplinary matters.  While many court cases 
state that this discretion exists, it is granted inconsistently between 
courts.185   
Some courts have granted a great deal of discretion by declining 
to review academic disciplinary cases.  At the other extreme, some 
  
181. Schaer, 735 N.E.2d at 378, 380. 
182. Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994). 
183. Id. at 242–43. 
184. Id. at 247. 
185. See Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 578–79 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (stating that such discretion exists and performing a brief 
analysis of relevant cases). 
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courts have conducted a de novo factual review of academic discip-
linary cases.  Courts, however, are quite consistent in their analysis 
of behavioral disciplinary proceedings.  These cases are properly 
determined without any reference to discretion because courts are 
more familiar with the facts relating to behavioral discipline. 
Private academic institutions should not expect to be granted dis-
cretion by a court at a trial concerning an academic disciplinary pro-
ceeding.  Rather, the institution should adopt policies and procedures 
that ensure a fundamentally fair process and are consistent with the 
published disciplinary policy.  For example, to insure a fundamental-
ly fair process: (1) the disciplinary procedures should be published 
and distributed to students; (2) the accused student must be notified 
of all charges and evidence relevant to the proceeding; (3) the ac-
cused student should be permitted assistance in defense by either a 
faculty member or another student; and (4) a standing disciplinary 
committee having sanction authority should be established with an 
ability to record proceeding transcripts.   
To ensure institutional compliance with published disciplinary 
procedures, the procedures should be kept simple and vague.  Fur-
thermore, the published procedures should reserve the right to de-
viate from the disciplinary process as long as fundamental fairness is 
maintained.  This reservation of right prevents the terms of the con-
tract from being interpreted “against the college as the author the-




186. Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977). 
